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The societe par actions simplifee (SAS) was introduced in 1994 and given 
more entensive scope in 1999. Regarded as being of a largely 
contractual nature, based on an element of personal co-operation 
between its members, it is likely to be used for a number of different 
purposes.
The French simplified share company (societe par actions 
simplifiee, SAS) was introduced in France by Law No. 84-1 of 3 
January 1994, which added a number of provisions to Law No. 
56-537 governing commercial companies and partnerships of 24 
July 1966. These provisions appear immediately below those 
which govern the societe en commandite par actions (SCA), a type ot 
corporation of which some members do not enjoy limited 
liability. The provisions governing the SCA appear after those 
governing the societe anonyme (SA), which is equivalent to the 
English public limited liability company.
The third paragraph of art. 262-1 of the Law of 24 July 1966 
(as amended) provides that in so far as they are compatible with 
the rules governing the SAS, the rules governing the SA, with the, 
exception of those contained in art. 89 to 177-1, are applicable 
thereto. Articles 89-177-1 contain rules governing the traditional 
management structure of SAs (i.e. those with a conseil 
d'administration or board of directors), whilst art. 118-150 contain 
provisions governing the alternative system with an executive 
board (directoire) and supervisory board (conseil de surveillance). 
Articles 151 to 177-1 principally concern general meetings, 
voting rights, and rights to documents and information. In 
applying the relevant tasks, the powers of the board of directors 
or the president of an SA are exercised by the president of the 
SAS, or those of the managers so designated in the company's 
statutes. The SAS may employ different forms of corporate 
governance from those familiar in the SA. It benefits from limited 
liability and a considerable degree of contractual freedom. The 
latter may be subject to some abuses however. Furthermore, 
businessmen who do not benefit trom adequate legal advice may 
sometimes fail to provide, or provide adequately, for certain 
contingencies such as the convocation of meetings or quorums, 
and the courts are likely to be required on occasions to interpret 
their defective agreements. However, forms and precedents 
would seem likely to be devised for the use of persons 
contemplating the formation of an SAS. 3~~
The new entity was introduced to combat certain rigidities in 
French law governing such entities as the SA and the SARL 
(societe a responsabilite limitee   private limited liability company), 
which could not always be overcome by means of the
introduction of special provisions in the company's statutes, or 
by means of the provisions ol shareholders agreements, which 
were sometimes of doubtful validity. When the SAS was first 
introduced it was made subject to two significant limitations, 
one of which was removed by art. 3 of Law No. 99-587 of 12 
July 1999, which made substantial amendments to Law No. 94- 
1 of 3 January 1994. The limitation which remains is contained 
in Article 262-3 of the Law of 24 July 1966 (as amended), 
which provides that an SAS may not offer its shares for 
subscription by the public.
The removal of the first-mentioned limitation by the Law of 
July 12 1994 has greatly increased the scope of the SAS. Such a 
company was originally required by the first paragraph of art. 
261-1 be made up of members which were societes (companies 
or partnerships) having a capital of at least FF 1,500,000. Such 
a company was also open to certain public undertakings 
belonging to the state. These limitations have meant that the 
SAS seems to have been used, at first, principally as a medium 
for co-operation between different companies, sometimes 
situated in different countries. It has the advantages over theo
EEIG (European Economic Interest Grouping) or its French 
counterpart, the GIF, that it can have as one of its objects the 
earning of profits, and that members are only subject to limited 
liability, and not (as in the GIF or EEIG) to joint and several 
unlimited liability for the debts of the entity. An SAS may also 
prove useful as the dominant company in a group of 
undertakings.
The law of 12 July 1999 removed the limitations contained in 
the above paragraph. The first paragraph of art. 161-1 provides 
that an SAS may be formed by one or more persons whose 
liability for the debts of the company only extends to the amount 
of their agreed contributions. It apparendy follows from this not 
entirely clearly-drafted provision, that natural as well as legal 
persons may be members of an SAS because, in so far as 
companies may be members of such an entity, their liability is 
usually limited; thus if only such bodies qualified for membership 
ol an SAS, there was little or no need to include a statement as 
to liability. The unsatisfactory draftsmanship of this provision 
probably results from the fact that the new provisions of art. 3 of
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Law 99-587 owe their existence to a parliamentary amendment 
to a bill essentially concerned with research and innovation, 
which unfortunately did not receive the detailed examination 
usually reserved for provisions of company law. It seems clear 
from the travaux preparatories that the relevant provisions were 
intended to cover both legal and natural persons (note in this 
sense Germain, ]CP, 1994, 1.379-9). The new provisions 
imposed no limitation as to the capital of such persons; however 
the minimum capital of an SAS is still required to be FF 250,000. 
Thus, art. 3 of the Law of 12 July 1999 opened the SAS to a 
much wider range of persons, as well as permitting the single 
member SAS (which may, as with German one-man companies, 
be used by sole entrepreneurs and as a subsidiary), art. 261-1, 
paragraph I, provides that where an SAS has only one member, 
such a simple member may exercise the powers granted to the 
'members' where a collective decision is provided for. If the 
membership of an SAS falls below, the provisions of art. 1444-5 
of the Civil Code remain inapplicable. This text provides that if 
all the shares of a company or partnership are held by one 
person, the company shall not be automatically dissolved but it 
may be dissolved at the request of any interested party if the 
situation has not been regularised within one year.
It will be noted that an SAS is not treated as an SA (public 
company or societe anonyme), but rather as a type of share 
company (societe par actions). For this reason, the Community 
company law directives are probably not applicable to it. 
However, according to art. 32 of Law No 93-1353 the SAS is 
taxed as a public company, even though it may well be thought 
of as being more similar to a private one; indeed it seems to have 
been to some extent inspired by the Dutch besloten Vennotschap 
(private or closed company with limited liability). The members 
of an SAS are called associes, a word which emphasises the 
element of personal cooperation (intuitus personae) between 
them. The 'personalistic' character of an SAS is stressed by 
Guyon and other commentators.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATUTES
It is obvious from the provisions of Law 94-1 of 3 January 
1994 that the SAS was intended to be ajlexible form (note in this 
sense, Guyon, Die Societe par Actions Simplifiee (SAS)   eine neue 
Geselhchafisform in Frankreich, ZGR, 1994, p. 551) and combines 
the advantages of legal personality and a considerable degree of 
contractual freedom. Those features are already present in the 
French GIF (groupement d'interet economique) and in the EEIG, 
but as emphasised above, these bodies have certain 
disadvantages.
Collective decisions
As has already been indicated, the rules governing general 
meetings and the management of an SAS are made inapplicable 
to the SAS by art. 262-1 of the Law of 24 July 1966 (as 
amended). These rules may be replaced by specific provisions in 
the company's statutes. Thus, art. 262-10, paragraph 1 provides 
that the statutes determine the decisions which must be taken 
collectively by the members, in accordance with the forms and 
conditions which they prescribe. However, paragraph 2 of this 
article provides that certain decisions must be taken collectively; 
the collectivity referred to in this case will be the members (or 
perhaps, if the statutes so provide), the managers of the SAS. 
Such decisions relate to the increase and reduction ol the
company's capital, the redemption of its shares, the nomination 
of its statutory auditors, the approval of its annual accounts and 
the allocation of the profits, the company's merger with another 
company, and its division or liquidation.
General meetings of an SAS may be replaced by a written 
consultation of members, or by a document signed by all of 
them if the statutes so provide. The general meetings of such a 
company may be given greater or lesser powers than that of an 
SA. Individual members may also be given special powers by the 
statutes. The latter may determine the period of notice for 
meetings, the persons entitled to call them, the necessary 
quorum for meetings, and the required majorities for decisions. 
The statutes may also provide that persons who are not 
members may participate in certain decisions. Shareholders' 
agreements as to voting would also seem to be permissible, and 
particular shareholders may also hold different classes of shares, 
which entitle them to different voting rights.
Management of the company
The considerable liberty which is given to an SAS to prescribe 
by statutes how the members of the company shall exercise their 
powers, and what powers shall be given to them, is paralleled by 
the equally flexible position in relation to the organisation and 
functioning of the management of the company. The SAS does 
not need to have a conseil d'administration (board of directors) or 
a directoire (executive board) and a conseil de surveillance 
(supervisory board), but it may if it wishes adopt one of these 
two statutory models or combine features of both of them. The 
managers may be legal or natural persons and do not have to be 
members of the company. Managers may be appointed for a 
limited time or for life. The carrying out of particular 
transactions may be made subject to the approval of the general 
meeting of (if one exists) to that of the supervisory board.
Certain flexible rules
The rules governing the transfer of shares contained in art. 262- 
14 and 262-15, and those concerning the exclusion of members 
contained in art. 262-17, have a flexible character because 
members are not bound to include them in the statutes, and are 
able to a greater or lesser extent, to determine the details of the 
relevant statutory provisions. Because of their detail, these rules 
receive separate consideration below: it follows from art. 262-21 
that they are inapplicable to single member companies.
MANDATORY RULES GOVERNING THE SAS
Certain of the mandatory rules have already been considered 
above. These include those contained in art. 262-0 of the Law 
of 24 July 1996, as amended, requiring a collective decision of 
the members of the company in certain laws, and requiring the 
management report, annual accounts and consolidated accounts 
of a single member company to be drawn up by the president 
thereof, and approved by the single member after receiving a 
report from the statutory auditor within six months of the end 
of the financial year.
As mentioned above, certain of the mandatory rules 
governing the SAS, including the requirement that its capital 
should be at least FF 1,500,000 have been abrogated. This is 
also true of the former requirement contained in art. 262-2 that 
the shares of an SAS should be fully paid up, as well as the 25
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requirement that all its members should be companies or 
partnerships. However, a certain number of mandatory rules are 
still applicable to the SAS. Thus, as already indicated, an SAS 
may not request members of the public to subscribe for its 
shares. These may not be in bearer form.
Representative powers of the president
The most important of the mandatory requirements is 
considered by Guyon (op. cit., p. SOS) to be that contained in 
art. 262-1, which is obviously intended to protect third parties. 
This text is clearly influenced by the provisions of the First 
Directive on Company Law (OJ Special Edition 1968(1), pp. 
41 45). It provides that the company is represented in relation 
to third parties by a president designated in accordance with the 
requirements laid down by the statutes. The president is said to 
have the most extensive powers of acting in all circumstances in 
the name of the company within the limits of its objects. 
Furthermore, the company is deemed to be bound even by the 
acts of the president in relation to third parties which do not 
come within the scope of the objects of the company, except 
where he can prove that the third party knew that the act was 
outside the company's objects or he could not ignore that it was 
in the relevant circumstances; however the mere publication of 
the statutes is not treated as evidence of the latter. Finally, rules 
in the statutes limiting the powers of the president may not be 
invoked as against third parties.
If the president of an SAS is a legal as opposed to a natural 
person art. 262-8 provides that the managers thereof are subject 
to the same requirements, obligations and liabilities as if they 
had carried out the functions of president themselves. Although 
the powers of representation of the president are unlimited and 
illimitable in relation to third parties, it would seem possible to 
limit their exercise in relation to the company itself. Such 
internal powers might possibly be exercised instead by some 
other organ of the company. (Note the comprehensive article by 
Kandler and Seske, 'Die Societe par Actions Simplifee (SAS)   
Schaffunp einer vereinfachten "Aktienpesellschaft franzosischen
o o
Rechts"', Die AG, 1994, p. 447, at p. 449 in this sense.)
Managers' liabilities
According to art. 262-9, the rules governing the 
responsibilities of the members of the board of directors and the 
executive board of SAS are applicable to the president and the 
managers of an SAS. Thus, according to art. 244(1) of the Law 
of 24 July 1966, they are liable in damages for defective 
management, and for breaches of their legal duties and of the 
company's statutes. Such a breach of the statutes may occur 
where the managers exceed their managerial or representative 
powers. If a defective managerial measure has led to a depletion 
of the company's assets, those responsible for it may, in 
accordance with art. 180 of the Law No. 85/98 of 25 January 
1985, be required to fulfil the company's obligations. This law 
places a similar burden on de facto managers, who have been 
acting as such but have not been properly appointed.
Rules governing certain categories of agreement
Article 262-11 contains a rule rather similar to that contained 
in art. 101 of the Law of 24 July 1966 (as amended) governing 
certain agreements entered into by public companies. However,
the scope of art. 262-11 is less extensive than that of art. 101. 
According to art. 262-11, the statutory auditor is required to 
make a report to the members on agreements entered into 
directly, or through an intermediary, between the company and 
its president or its managers. The members are requested to 
decide on this report. Agreements which are not approved by 
the members cannot be challenged as far as third parties are 
concerned, but the interested party, the president and the other 
managers may be required to pay damages to the company if the 
agreement has prejudicial consequences for it.
FUTURE USE
It is difficult to predict the future of the SAS following its 
'liberalisation' in 1999. When the new regime comes to be 
more generally understood, the SAS may well tend to supplant 
the SA and the SARL (private limited liability company) in 
some fields of activity.
A new paragraph was added to art. 242-11 by the Law of 12 
July 1999, which provides that in derogation from the 
provisions of the first paragraph of this article requiring the 
statutory auditor to make a report to the members on the 
relevant agreements, when the company has only one member it 
is only necessary to mention such agreements in the register 
kept by the company of decisions taken by it. It should be noted 
that the other provisions of art. 262-11, which have been 
mentioned above, are also applicable to single member 
companies.
The rules contained in art. 262-11 are stated by art. 262-12 
to be inapplicable to agreements governing current transactions 
and concluded under normal conditions. A similar rule applies 
to SAs, but not to SARLs.
In addition to the agreements regulated by art. 262-11 and 
262-12, certain other agreements are covered by art. 262-13. 
These agreements are in fact prohibited. The president and the 
managers cannot enter into any form of loan agreement with the 
company, be granted an overdraft by it in a current or other 
account, or have their obligations in relation to third parties 
guaranteed by the company if they held office at the time of the 
carrying out of the company's undertaking. Agreements which 
infringe this prohibition are void.
Concert parties
Individuals or companies are treated as acting in concert 
when they have agreed to acquire or transfer shares or use voting 
rights with the intention of pursuing a common policy towards 
the issuer (Law of 24 July 1996, art. 256-1-3, paragraph 1). It 
is often difficult to prove such joint action and so it is presumed 
in certain cases. Thus, action in concert is presumed between 
the members of an SAS and the companies which it controls 
(art. 356-1-3, final paragraph). This presumption is therefore 
applicable where it is necessary to inform a company that 
certain thresholds have been crossed in relation to share 
ownership, and in relation to transactions involving theI o
acquisition of control. As is to some extent the case under 
English law, the concert parties are treated as though they were 
a single person (see Companies Act 1985, s. 205). If the members 
of an SAS hold more than one third of the capital of a quoted
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company, they are required to make a public offer for the 
remainder (Regulations of the Stock Exchange Commission, art. 
5-4-1).
Other restrictions based on general company law
An SAS is a company limited by shares. As already indicated, 
it is subject to all the rules governing such companies, except 
those governing general meetings, management and 
administration (art. 262-1, para. 2 of Law of 24 July 1966, as 
amended; see Guyon, op. cit., p. 561 for a clear account of the 
governing rules). The rules governing the accounts of such a 
company are thus similar to those applicable to those of an SA. 
However, the Fourth and Seventh Directives on company 
accounts do not seem applicable to such companies. 
Shareholders of the company holding individually or collectively 
may petition the court to appoint one or several experts to 
report on one or more management decisions (art. 226 of the 
Law of 1966), or to dismiss any statutory auditor who cannot 
properly fulfil his functions (art. 227, ibid.). The rules 
contained in Law No. 66-537 of 24 July 1966 governing the 
SAS are applicable to the formation, the nullity, and the 
dissolution and liquidation of such companies, as well as their 
merger with other companies and their decision. The rules 
contained in art. 360 of the 1966 law concerning the 
amendment of resolutions of an SA are also applicable to an 
SAS.
All French civil and commercial companies are governed by 
the general principles contained in art. 1832ff of the Civil Code. 
These rules entail that the allocation ot profits and losses shall 
not take place in an arbitrary way which is unfair to individual 
shareholders; that the rights of such shareholders must
* o
correspond to their shares in the company's capital, and that the 
obligations of shareholders cannot be increased without their 
individual consent. Furthermore, shareholders have the right to 
be informed of and to participate in collective decisions.
RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER OF SFIARES: 
EXCLUSION OF MEMBERS
The above mentioned matters are regulated by art. 262-11 to 
262-21. It must first of all be noted that provisions may only be 
included in the statutes of an SAS concerning restrictions on the 
transfer of shares and the exclusion of members, if all the 
members agree thereto. The relevant provisions of art. 262-14 
to 262-20 concerning these matters are not applicable to single 
member companies.
Guyon (op. cit., ZGR, 1994, p. 561) contends that the 
existence of the above provisions may be explained on the basis 
of the 'personalistic' character of the company, which is thought 
of as involving the mutual loyalty, trust and co-operation of 
members who are generally known to one another. These 
provisions would seem likely to help to maintain such a 
character. It may well be the case that, like German private 
companies, the SAS will come to be used for different purposes, 
and that certain of them may not be of a markedly personalistic 
ch acter.
Restrictions on share transfers
According to art. 262-14, the statutes of a company may 
provide that its shares shall be inalienable for a maximum period
of ten years. Such a restriction may be imposed on all shares, or 
only on the shares of a particular class. It follows from art. 262- 
16 that any purported transfer of such shares is a nullity. Such 
clauses may be of use in enterprises whose success cannot be 
guaranteed for some period of time: they may, of course, give 
rise to conflict. Article 262-15 provides that the statutes of the 
company may require the latter's prior approval for any share 
transfer. This type of clause is sometimes encountered in the 
statutes of public companies. However, in contrast with the 
position of such companies, the approval clause in the statutes 
of an SAS seems applicable to any form of transfer. It may well 
prove valuable in conserving the identity of the members of the 
company. However, it may be difficult to determine whether an 
operation which takes place by reason of a merger or division is 
to be properly regarded as a share transfer, and thus the 
company's statutes should perhaps specifically provide whether 
the approval clause applies to such transactions. They should 
also specify which body has to give its approval, by what 
majority, and whether the intending transferor may vote in 
connection with the decision.
There is nothing in art. 262-15 specifically stating what is to 
happen if agreement is refused. However, it would seem that the 
rules which have been applied by the courts where this situation 
occurs in public companies (Paris, December 21 1983, Revue des 
Societes, 1989, p. 51) are also applicable to the SAS, which is 
thus itself required to purchase the shares if approval is refused.
The price at which the shares may be transferred may be 
determined in accordance with the provisions of the statutes, or 
by agreement between the parties, or by an expert in accordance 
with the requirements of art. 1843-4 of the Civil Code (art. 262- 
19, Law of 24 July 1966, as amended). In some cases, it may 
well prove advantageous for the vendor if the price has not been 
fixed by, or in accordance with the states. It seems, however, 
that the vendor might have the remedy of refusing to sell his 
shares if the price fixed was unduly low. (see Guyon, op. cit., 
ZGR, 1994, p. 563). It is not clear whether the courts have any 
control over the method of fixing the price stipulated in the 
statutes (see Guyon, op. cit., Die AG, 1994, p. 453).
PITFALLS
The largely contractual basis of the new French entity may give 
rise to pitfalls for inexperienced people who lack adequate 
legal advice and fail to make adequate provision for certain 
necessary matters in the statutes of the SAS.
The exclusion of members
There appears to be some doubt as to whether exclusion 
clauses in the statutes of a company are generally permissible 
under French law. However, art. 262-17 provides that under 
conditions stated therein, the statutes may provide that a 
member is bound to transfer his/her shares. It also stipulates 
that the pecuniary rights of a member who does not proceed 
with such a transfer may be suspended. It will be noted that art. 
262-17 does not attempt to stipulate the circumstances under 
which a member may be excluded, art. 262-19, paragraph 2 
provides that if the shares are purchased by the company, the 
latter is bound to transfer them within a period of six months, 
or to cancel them.
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The statutes of the company should prescribe whether the 
shares of the member who is excluded should be purchased by 
the company, or by a member or members thereof. They should 
also state the grounds for exclusion (which may well include 
repeated personal conflicts with other members), mention 
which organ is competent to decide thereon, and give the 
member affected particulars of the grounds. Furthermore, it 
may be desirable for them to require that the member should be 
present when the decision is to be taken, and state the period of 
time within which the exclusion is to take place. (See Kindler 
and Seseke, op. cit., Die AG, 1994, p. 454. The authors consider 
it advisable that the statutes should contain rules governing the 
evidential burden of the existence of a ground for exclusion).
It appears that a decision to exclude a member is subject to 
review by the courts if the requirements of the statutes have not 
been complied with, or perhaps if the consideration to be given 
for the shares manifestly fails to reflect their real value. However, 
it appears to follow from art. 360 of the Law of 24 July 1966 
that legal transactions entered into by, and resolution of, an SAS 
must be annulled within three years. Such resolutions may be 
treated as including decisions by the organ competent to decide 
on the exclusion of a member.
A more limited provision concerning the exclusion of a 
member is contained in art. 262-18. This rather complex 
provision stipulates that the statutes may provide that where the 
control of a company or partnership which is a member of an 
SAS is altered within the meaning of art. 355-1 of the law of 24 
July 1966 (as amended), the latter company or partnership must 
inform the SAS. The provisions of art. 355-1 are themselves 
rather complex. They are fully set out in Le Gall and Morel, 
French Company Law, 2nd ed., Longmans (1992), pp. 240 1. The 
SAS may decide in accordance with the requirements laid down 
by the statutes to suspend the non-pecuniary (e.g. the voting) 
rights of the relevant member, or to exclude it. Article 262-18 
does not say how the exclusion is to take place. This, it seems, 
will usually (if not invariably) take place by means of compulsory 
transfer of the shares. The former dispositions are said to apply 
also to a member which acquires that status as the result of a 
merger or division or the dissolution of a company.
The provisions of art. 262-18 are rather obviously intended to 
conserve the personalistic character of the company.
The rules governing the price which has be paid when shares 
are transferred in pursuance of an approval clause, and the 
statutes of the company do not contain any provisions governing 
how the sale price is to be calculated, are also applicable where 
the company's statutes contain a provision based on art. 217-17 
or 217-18, but contain nothing about the calculation ot the
transfer price. Thus the latter may be agreed on between the 
relevant parties, or as a result of an arbitration procedure 
conducted by an expert, in accordance with art. 1843-4 of the 
Civil Code.
There is nothing in the legislation of 1994 or 1999 governing 
the voluntary withdrawal of members of an SAS. This is 
frequently permissible under US close company statutes, and 
may take place in a German GmbH (private limited liability 
company) where the statutes of the company so provide, and if 
they do not, where there is serious reason for it. It may well be 
the case that withdrawal from an SAS is permissible under 
French law where the statutes provide for it.
FINAL REMARKS
It is difficult to predict the future of the SAS following its 
'liberalisation' in 1999. When the new regime comes to be 
more generally understood, the SAS may well tend to supplant 
the SA and the SARL (private limited liability company) in some 
fields of activity. Although the new regime is more 
comprehensive and useful than that contained in the German 
law of 9 August 1994 (BGBI1.1961) on small public companies, 
it still appears rather complex, and also fails to include any 
special protective provisions for minority shareholders 
comparable to those contained in s. 459 461 of the Companies 
Act 1985, which have their counterparts in the Republic of 
Ireland and most Commonwealth countries. The largely 
contractual basis of the new French entity may give rise to 
pitfalls for inexperienced people who lack adequate legal advice 
and fail to make adequate provision lor certain necessary 
matters in the statutes of the SAS.
Although it is likely that a new type of limited partnership may 
soon be available in the UK for two or more persons engaged in 
trade, industry and the professions, there does not seem to have 
been any demand for the introduction of a new entity 
corresponding to the SAS. Such a demand may perhaps come 
about if and when recent developments in France, and 
prospective ones in Germany, become more widely known. (&
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